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1. Introduction  
Rice  and  wheat  are  the  two  major  foodgrains  whose  production  growth 
determines the self-sufficiency of the country. Per capita production of rice and wheat 
has substantially increased from 120 kgs in 1981 to over 144 kgs during the recent 
year.  Meanwhile,  the  food  basket  has  become  much  more  diversified.  Dramatic 
changes in food consumption patterns have taken place in India in the post green 
revolution period (Meenakshi, 2001). Consumers’ preference is more towards non-
cereals and among cereals the preference is rice and wheat to coarse cereals. Coarse 
grains are now increasingly used as cattle or poultry feed and hence their importance 
in foodgrain availability for human consumption is considerably reduced. There is a 
shift in the consumption pattern in favour of superior food items like milk, vegetables, 
fruits, animal foods and so on. The demand projections for cereals, which take into 
consideration changing consumer preferences, come out with demand estimates for 
cereals,  which  match  favourably  with  the  supply  projections  indicating  that  the 
requirements of cereals in the country will be adequately met by domestic supplies 
during  the  period  of  at  least  upto  the  year  2020.  Praduman’s  (Kumar,  1998) 
projections with constant growth in total factor productivity and with deceleration in 
total  factor  productivity,  the  cereals  supply  will  be  309  and  270  million  tonnes 
respectively. Projections of G.S. Bhalla (1999) by extrapolating 1965-1993 trends the 
supply would be 347 million tonnes and 251 million tonnes by increased fertilizer use 
and irrigation. Through the IMPACT model of IFPRI the base calculation projects the 
cereals supply to 256 million tonnes and with additional land degradation 234 and 271 
million tonnes with reduced land degradation. The supply forecasts therefore range 
from 250 to over 300 million tonnes (Arvind Virmani and Rajeev, 2001).    2 
Availability of food grains is not a sufficient condition to ensure food security 
to the poor also necessary that the poor have sufficient means to purchase food. The 
means are by raising the level of incomes by additional employment and supply food 
grains to the poor at subsidised prices through government mechanism. In this line 
farmers’ income is prevented from falling to lower levels by minimum support prices 
(MSP) at reasonable levels during years of good crop yield and also through various 
welfare programmes. The problem of chronic food insecurity due to poverty is being 
checked  by  the  operation  of  Public  Distribution  System  (PDS)  through  which 
foodgrains are distributed at subsidised prices. PDS has been one of the most crucial 
elements in food policy and food security system in country since 1939, first set up in 
Bombay by British (Shankkar Aiyar, 2005). The Government of India introduced a 
targeted PDS (TPDS) in 1997 under which foodgrains are being allocated to the states 
on the basis of the estimates of population the poverty line (Dev et al., 2003). It is 
regarded as a safety net to the poor whose number is more than 330 million and are 
nutritionally at risk. Further, it is regarded as an important delivery channel in the 
management of food security system of India; with a network of nearly half a million 
Fair Price Shops (FPS) catering to the needs of 199 million of ration cardholders. It is 
one of the largest of its kind in the world, handling around 15 per cent of the total 
availability of foodgrains in the country (State Planning Commission, 2004).  
Fluctuations  in  agricultural  output  mainly  due  to  weather  uncertainty, 
inadequate irrigation facilities and heavy dependence on monsoons resulted poor price 
or  income  realization  and  may  lead  to  transitory  food  insecurity.  Buffer  stock 
operations ensure the welfare of the consumers as well as producers and stabilize the 
price  of  food  grains.  The  national  objective  of  growth  with  social  justice  and 
progressive improvements in the living standards of the population make it imperative 
to ensure that foodgrain is made available at reasonable prices. PDS has been evolved   3 
to reach the urban and the rural population in order to protect the consumers from the 
fluctuating  and  escalating  price  syndrome.  Continuous  availability  of  foodgrain  is 
ensured at fair price through about 0.46 million FPS spread throughout the country. 
2. The Issue  
2.1. Higher production and procurement price but poor offtake  
At present the problem in the country is not the shortage of foodgrains but in 
search of ways and means to manage the accumulated surplus.  Despite a decline in 
area under foodgrain crops in India the two main staple grains together registered 
annual production growth of 3.59 per cent in the 1980s and 2.28 per cent in 1990s 
which was above the population growth rate of 1.9 per cent (Economic Survey, 2003). 
A marginal growth in output of two staple grains, rice and wheat, which exceeds the 
growth of population results additional availability of a few million tonnes.  
Commission  for  Agricultural  Costs  and  Prices  (CACP)  is  for  advising  the 
government in respect of pricing agricultural commodities. At present 25 agricultural 
commodities  are  covered  under  its  mandate.  The  Commission  is  required  to 
recommend the Minimum Support Price (MSP) to the Government well before the 
sowing  season  of  the  crop.  Relatively  higher  prices  of  MSP  for  rice  and  wheat 
increased the profitability of these crops and motivated the farmers to divert their 
areas to these crops from coarse cereals, pulses and even oilseeds especially in the 
Punjab and Haryana (PTI, 2004). Higher the production and MSP the farmers bring 
maximum possible quantum of produce for selling it to the Food Corporation of India 
(FCI). With price stabilization concern, higher level procurement of rice and wheat by 
FCI  has  resulted  in  huge  surplus  stocks,  which  are  much  above  the  buffer  stock 
norms.  At  the  same  time  the  deficit  states  like  Bihar,  Assam  and  Eastern  Uttar 
Pradesh in the past, have started generating surpluses of cereals and draw less from 
the central pool. Poor offtake of foodgrains under PDS   (Table 1) has also aggravated   4 
effects of abundant stocks.  Differential pricing to Below  Poverty  Line  (BPL) and 
Above Poverty Line (APL) affects the off take position.  
Table 1. Foodgrains allocation and offtake under public distribution system  
(Million Tonnes)  
Wheat  Rice  Year 
Allocation  Offtake  Allocation  Offtake 
1991-92   10.56  8.83  11.36  10.17 
1995-96   11.31  5.29  14.62  9.46 
1999-00   10.37  5.76  13.84  11.31 
2000-01   11.57  4.07  16.26  7.97 
2001-02   13.14  5.68  17.23  8.16 
2002-03   29.45  6.12  27.35  7.39 
2003-04  -  49.16*  -  - 
Source: http://indiabudget.nic and Economic Survey (2004-05) 
* Wheat and Rice together 
 
2.2. Why mounting foodgrains stock a concern?  
The existence of large stockholding seems  to be a  proof of how India has 
become a surplus producer of foodgrains but carrying cost of buffer stock has been 
rising at the rate of 15 per cent per annum in the 1990s (Srinivasan and Jha, 1999). A 
steady availability of foodgrains at reasonable prices is assured to people, which is 
lower than actual costs due to subsidy that accounts for about 45 per cent of the 
economic cost. In addition to higher carrying cost increase in procurement price also 
raised the economic cost. Increase in food subsidy is also due to high carrying cost of 
stocks  in  excess  of  the  buffer  norms.  The  efficacy  of  buffer  stocking  policies  is 
reflected  in  the  stability  of  foodgrain  consumption  and  prices.  However,  it  is 
becoming  increasingly  evident  that  stabilisation  operations  involving  physical 
handling of foodgrains are fiscally expensive (World Bank, 1999). The annual food 
subsidy involved in maintaining the system is huge and share of food subsidy to the 
total government expenditure is rising (Table 2).    5 
Table 2. Share of food subsidy to total government expenditure  
Year  Food subsidy* (Rs. Crore)  % of Total Government Expenditure 
1990-91   2450  2.33 
1995-96   4960  2.78 
1999-00   9200  3.03 
2000-01   12125  3.61 
2001-02   17612  4.83 
2002-03   21200  5.17 
2003-04   25800  - 
2004-05   17639  - 
Source:  Arvind  Virmani  and  Rajeev  (2001),  http://indiabudget.nic  and  Shankkar 
Aiyar (2005) and Economic Survey (2004-05) 
*Food subsidy covers sugar also  
The minimum support price (MSP) scheme served the country well in the past 
three and a half decades helped exploiting the opportunity created by green revolution 
and led to much high levels of production as well as public stock of wheat and rice. 
But expenditure reforms commission has recommended that the cost of holding stocks 
in excess of the requirement for National Food Security and for PDS, arising from 
generous  MSP and  procurement, be  reflected in  the  budget as producers’  subsidy 
rather than consumer subsidy. Food subsidy policy seems helping the surplus farmers 
more than the poor consumers. Because of the farm lobby, the government has been 
procuring the entire quantum offered by the farmers instead of procuring only to the 
nominal stock level (Table 3). As a result, there has been a remarkable accumulation 
of stocks in recent periods (Patnaik, 2000).  
Table 3. Central Foodgrain Stocks against Minimum Buffer Stock (beginning of 
January) 
(Million Tonnes)  
Wheat   Rice   Total  
Minimum   Actual   Minimum   Actual   Minimum   Actual   year 
Norm   Stock   Norm   Stock   Norm   Stock  
1995   7.7  12.9  7.7  17.4  15.4  30.3 
2000  8.4  17.2  8.4  14.2  16.8  31.4 
2001  8.4  25.0  8.4  20.7  16.8  45.7 
2002  8.4  32.4  8.4  25.6  16.8  58.0 
2003  8.4  28.8  8.4  19.4  16.8  48.2 
2004  8.4  12.7  8.4  11.7  16.8  24.4 
2005  8.4  8.9  8.4  12.8  16.8  21.7 
Source: Economic Survey (2004-05)    6 
The minimum support prices at levels much above market clearing prices are 
not desirable. Whenever MSP is raised farmers find it more lucrative to sell their 
produce to the Government than to sell it in the open market. For a number of recent 
past few years, the government has set prices particularly of wheat, at higher levels 
than recommended by the CACP (Table 4).  
Table 4. Minimum Support Prices for Fair Average Quality Wheat and Paddy  
(Rs/Qtl)  
Paddy  Wheat 
Year  CACP  MSP revised  Difference  CACP  MSP 
revised 
Difference 
1990-91   205  205  -  200  215  15 
1995-96   355  360  5  360  360  - 
1999-00   465  490  25  490  550  60 
2000-01   510  510  -  550  580  30 
2001-02   520  530  10  580  610  30 
2002-03   530  550  20  585  620  35 
2003-04  550  550  -  630  630  - 
2004-05  560  560  -  640  640  - 
Source: Economic Survey (2003 and 2004-05)  
MSP of other agricultural commodities also increased from time to time for a 
balanced response by farmers who greatly responded towards the higher MSP to rice 
and wheat especially in Punjab and Haryana. This decision increased the budgetary 
burden. As FCI is not able to offload its stocks, open market prices rise sharply. The 
procurement policy of the government is thus resulting in higher food stocks, higher 
inflation  for  foodgrains  and  a  bigger  food  subsidy  (Arvind  Virmani  and  Rajeev, 
2001). The government will have to finance the addition to stock. This is done by 
cutting some other expenditure especially adjusting the investment. Less would be 
invested in agriculture. Irrigation capacity would not grow as much. The cumulative 
impact of lower irrigation would reduce growth rate of agricultural output despite 
higher procurement price. Farmers themselves could be worse off compared to what 
they could have been had investment in irrigation not reduced (Parikh et. al., 2003).  
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2.3. Efficacy of the Mechanism  
Along  with  higher  procurement  price,  increasing  carrying  cost  thus  the 
economic  cost  and  inefficiency  in  stocking  and  distribution  further  tighten  the 
situation. Dutta and Ramaswami (2001) at Indian Statistical Institute examined the 
food subsidy pattern and found only 56 to 58.5 per cent of the total food subsidy 
(Centre and State combined) reaches the PDS consumers. Leakages range from 15 to 
28 per cent of the subsidy while 16 to 26.5 per cent of the subsidy is absorbed up by 
the  inefficiency  of  the  government  procurement  and  distribution system  (FCI  and 
State level) relative to the market. Persistent inefficiencies in the operation of FCI are 
another reason for increasing economic cost (Jha and Srinivasan, 1999).  
As any monopoly, FCI suffers from inefficiency. Physical storage of grain by 
government agencies can lead to several inefficiencies. Most storage godowns with 
FCI are small-scale, low-quality structures; sometimes, grains are also stored in the 
open (known as covered and plinth storage-CAP) leading to heavy storage losses. A 
World Bank report (1999) states that half of FCI’s grain stocks is at least two years 
old, 30% between 2 and 4 years old, and some grains as old as 16 years. There is 
shortage of good quality storage facilities and mismatch in grain allocation to states 
leads  to  poor  offtake,  resulting  in  the  rotting  of  grains  in  godowns  and  quality 
deterioration due to pests (storage insects and rodents) and microorganisms (toxin 
producing fungus). In addition to that at least 3 million tonnes of these food stocks are 
stolen or rotted because of inadequate storage conditions.  
Central issue prices are different for the same quality of the foodgrains to two 
different target groups namely the BPL and APL families. The central issue price is 
determined  based  on  a  proportion  of  the  economic  cost  of  the  grains  (from 
procurement  to  distribution).  Recently  it  is  decided  to  charge  50  per  cent  of  the 
economic cost as the price of the foodgrain distributed to the BPL population and 70   8 
per cent for APL population, which was 100 per cent during the previous period. 
Perhaps only a limited proportion of the food requirement of the BPL population is 
met by the PDS, for the rest depend on the private traders.  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Selection of the model and suitability  
Policy  decisions  upon  the  level  of  procurement,  magnitude  of  revising  the 
MSP and increasing the offtake have great influence over the subsidy. To examine the 
implications of the policy decisions, Monte Carlo technique was chosen to simulate 
the base scenario. Simulation is one of the important techniques to observe a real 
system  and  not  an  optimization  technique  but  a  statistical  experiment.  Hence,  its 
output must be interpreted by appropriate statistical tests. This technique is suitable 
for analyzing a system where arrival and departure of events make significant changes 
in  the  system.  The  procedure  for  determining  samples  starts  with  generating 
independent 0 – 1 random numbers and then mapping them on the model. These 
random  numbers  can  be  generated  using  statistical  packages  that  are  statistically 
independent values of uniform distribution.  
3.2. The Model  
The  most  common  methods  of  collecting  observations  in  simulation  are 
Subinterval method, Replication method and Regenerative (cyclic) method. In this 
present analysis replication method was used to gather the observations appropriately. 
In this method each observation was represented by an independent simulation run 
and the observation averages for each batch was computed. The advantage of this 
replication method is that each simulation run is driven by a distinct (0, 1) random 
number  stream,  which  yields  observation  that  are  truly  statistically  independent. 
Making the run length sufficiently large the accuracy of the results increases (Taha,   9 
2003).  5  replications  and  5000  runs  for  each  replication  were  done.  Mean  and 
standard deviation were calculated for the gathered statistical observations to test the 
significance by the confidence interval procedure. For this present analysis level of 
foodgrains  procurement,  stock,  offtake,  inventory  cost  and  subsidy  variables  are 
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Where i=1 and 2 for rice and wheat respectively and n = 2.  
Calculated mean and standard deviation were used to test the significance 
within the confidence interval using the formula  










Mean α α  
Where  N  is  number  of  replications  and  α  is  probability  level.  Test  of 
significance  using  confidence  interval  for  the  simulation  results  is  given  in 
Appendix I. 
                                                
∗ 10 Million = 1 Crore   10 
4. Simulation results  
 
In the base scenario (2002-03), level of procurement of rice and wheat were 
25.6  and  32.4  million  tonnes  at  procurement  prices  Rs.  550  and  620  per  quintal 
respectively. This level of procurement added 18.2 million tonnes of rice and 26.3 
million tonnes of wheat to the existing stock while the offtake was only 7.4 million 
tonnes of rice and 6.1 million tonnes of wheat. This level of stock absorbed Rs. 18479 
crores as inventory cost in total. Central issue prices for rice and wheat were Rs. 565 
(BPL); 730 (APL) and      Rs. 415 (BPL); 510 (APL) respectively and an amount of 
Rs. 7,615 crores totally mobilized through the distribution. In the base scenario it was 
found that an amount     Rs. 11,674 crores was absorbed in the entire process of 
procurement till distribution, which accounted for 51 per cent of the total food subsidy 
and the expenditure on procurement of foodgrains, was also not recovered (Table 5).  
In scenario I, procurement at the recommended level so as to keep the stocks 
just at the normative level showed a cut in the subsidy level to an extent of 75 per cent 
compared to the base scenario. An amount of Rs. 500 crores will be saved through the 
normative level of procurement and adding only 2.50 million tonnes of foodgrains to 
the existing stock, which needs only an amount of Rs.896 crores for managing the 
stock.  In  addition  to  the  present  level  of  issues  prices  with  the  reduced  level  of 
subsidy, this decision may able to recover the expenditure incurred in procurement of 
the foodgrains. Scenario II is with a small change i.e. the procurement at the CACP 
recommended price (no revision of MSP) and others similar to the scenario I. This 
policy  decision  would  be  able  to  save  an  amount  of  Rs.  200  crores  and  with  a 
marginal cut in the subsidy. From the scenarios I and II it is evident that the revision 
and hike in the MSP over the CACP recommendation require only a few hundred 
cores, which contribute smaller proportion in the total food subsidy. But the level of   11 
procurement, offtake and CIPs (distribution at 50 and 75 per cent of the economics 
cost to the BPL and APL consumers) are the major factors determine the level of 
subsidy. Simulation result for total subsidy does not fall in the confidence interval due 
to multiplication of random number with lesser procurement level and no rise in MSP 
are greatly emphasized than in scenario I.  
Scenario III is perfect by decision where procurement at the recommended 
level, no rise in MSP and zero food subsidies. This may result in huge rise in CIPs of 
foodgrains as PDS would try to mobilize an amount of Rs. 10,223 crores to recover 
the economic costs involved in the process. This gives rise to the average issue price 
to Rs 745 and 903 for rice and wheat respectively. Differential pricing can be done for 
the people living BPL and APL with different combinations. Scenario IV is pragmatic 
where the present level of procurement at revised MSP and increased offtake but 
leaving the normative buffer stock may bring a reduction in the inventory cost to half 
of the present level and the grains may distributed at the existing CIPs without any 
change.  An  important  point  to  note  here  is  that  with  the  existing  subsidy  level, 
increased level of offtake may lead to the recovery of the expenditure on procurement 
at the same time the consumers’ welfare may be unaffected.    12 
Table 5. Simulation results for changing level of procurement, rise in minimum support price and subsidy in India  
 
Scenarios   Commodity   Procurement 
(Rs. Crores) 
Additional cost 















































































































































Results are significant at 1 per cent level except for the paddy procurement and distribution in Scenario IV.  
Scenarios:  
I: Procurement for the normative level of stock  
II: Procurement for the normative level of stock and no increase in MSP  
III: Procurement for normative level of stock, no increase in MSP and subsidy is abolished  
IV: Procurement at base level and increase offtake leaving the nominal stock   13
 5. Discussion and Policy Implications  
 
Having achieved self-sufficiency in production the National Policy on foodgrains 
stock and distribution will not be successful unless the suitable strategic changes are to be 
implemented in the system. MSP recommended by CACP should be followed during the 
procurement of the foodgrains. Methodology for calculating MSP by CACP may cover 
only  the  variable  costs  of  the  farmers  and  should  not  be  meant  to  cover  their  entire 
production  costs.  A  food  security  buffer  stock  of  10  –  14  million  tonnes  would  be 
adequate. FCI should not procure all that is offered by the farmers but only to maintain an 
optimum level of buffer stock. The FCI can maintain a minimum level of buffer stock and 
then  undertake  open  market  operations  within  a  prescribed  price  band.  One  of  the 
recommended options is that FCI could also play a role in the international market for 
food grains by resorting to imports when stock levels are low and exporting food grains 
when there are surplus stocks. With this option the government can avoid costs associated 
with buffer stock operations such as procurement, storage, transportation and handling of 
grains. But the export of subsidized foodgrains is highly criticized.  
The government has to recognise the complementary role that private storage can 
play in stabilizing prices. Monopoly food procurement must be ended by allowing private 
agencies along with state procurement agencies to operate in all parts of the country. The 
restriction on private food grain trade must be lifted and the bias against them removed so 
that competitive forces can have freer play in reducing intermediation costs. In particular 
the constraints and restrictions on entry of modern food procurement, transport, processing 
and distribution companies must be removed so that the benefits of modern management 
practices like silo storage, logistics and large scale processing can flourish. Private sector 
participation in this sector may be sought and encouraged through measures such as Build-
Own-Operate-Transfer, Build-Own-Lease-Transfer, Build-Own-Operate, Lease-Develop-
Operate, and Joint ventures etc.    14
Food  stamp  system  can  be  tried  in  urban  food  markets  and  infrastructrally 
developed rural areas. Food credit cards with built-in identification for the target card 
holders (smart card technology), which can serve better than food stamps. It can serve as a 
single multi use card in banking, transportation, driving license, health care and physical 
access to work places.  
A  massive  food-for-work  public  works  programme  to  generate  and  maintain 
infrastructure, this would have had many positive effects upon the economy. It provides a 
tremendous opportunity to create rural infrastructure apart from generating employment 
for the poorest of the poor (Dev and Ranade 1997, Patnaik 2000 and Jayathi Ghosh 2003). 
Other  welfare  schemes  like  Mid  –  Day  –  Meal  –  Scheme,  Wheat  Based  Nutrition 
Programme (WBNP), Annapurna Scheme, Sampoorna Gramin Rozgar Yojna, World Food 
Programme  (WFP)  and  distributing  foodgrains  to  poor  students  hostels,  welfare 
institutions helped to improve offtake thus a reduction in the level of added stocks.  
Recently it was decided that Food Corporation of India (FCI) will be handling 
much  lower  level  of  stocks from  the  year  2004,  which  will  bring  down  its  inventory 
holding cost. During the year 2004 total foodgrain stocks in the Central pool were 32.28 
million tonnes, comprising 12.25 million tonnes of rice, 19.39 million tonnes of wheat and 
0.64 million tonnes of coarse grains. At these levels, stocks were not only less than half of 
what they were on two years ago when they touched a peak of 64.83 million tonnes but 
have also dipped to a six-year low (The Hindu, 2004). Without tinkering with the issue 
price of grains sold through the public distribution system (PDS), Government of India has 
cut Rs 2,000 crore in the budgeted food subsidy for 2004-05 over the figure projected in 
the beginning of 2004. This is despite there being no increase in the PDS issue price and 
rationalisation of the existing unlimited grain procurement regime.    15 
APPENDIX – I 
Confidence intervals for the simulation results 
Confidence Interval  Particulars   Scenario  Commodity  Mean  SD 
Left tail  Actual  Right tail 
Paddy  4649.11  670.61  3268.34  4872.00  6029.88  I to III 
Wheat  4878.01  704.88  3426.68  5124.00  6329.34 
Paddy  13338.72  704.06  11889.08  14848.00  14788.36 
Procurement (Rs.Crores)  
IV 
Wheat  20133.43  669.25  18755.46  19764.00  21511.40 
I  Wheat  199.92  28.89  140.44  210.00  259.40  Additional cost in revising MSP 
(Rs.Crores)   IV  Wheat  825.14  28.85  765.74  810.00  884.54 
Paddy  14.60  1.15  12.23  16.20  16.97  Offtake (MT)   IV 
Wheat  24.61  1.15  22.24  24.00  26.98 
Paddy  0.62  1.16  0.10  1.00  3.01  Added Stock (MT)   I to III 
Wheat  1.90  1.16  0.25  2.30  4.29 
Paddy  385.66  724.23  100.00  632.63  1876.83  Inventory cost (Rs.Crores)   I to III 
Wheat  510.22  310.84  150.00  613.68  1150.23 
Paddy  5034.77  1394.84  2162.83  5504.63  7906.71  III 
Wheat  5188.31  986.83  3156.46  5527.68  7220.16 
Paddy  9452.07  533.81  8352.97  11137.00  10551.17 
Revenue through Distribution @ CIP 
(Rs.Crores)  
IV 
Wheat  11380.10  747.14  9841.76  11100.00  12918.44 
I  Paddy  243.27  1394.84  125.00  719.61  3115.21 
IV  Paddy  9148.16  199.10  8738.22  8972.50  9558.10 
I  Wheat  2766.90  1044.61  616.08  3117.20  4917.72 
II  Wheat  2367.06  986.83  335.21  2697.20  4398.91 
Subsidy (Rs. Crores)  
IV  Wheat  11838.34  77.89  11677.97  11734.90  11998.71 










Mean α α  
Where N is number of replications = 5 and t0.005, 4 = 4.604    16 
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